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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Sarah Johnson appeals from the district court’s order summarily
dismissing her successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Johnson raises

three claims on appeal: (1) she contends the district court erred in denying her
request for additional DNA testing under I.C. § 19-4902; (2) she asks the Court to
overrule Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), contending the
Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in that case was “manifestly wrong,” “illogical,”
and “unwise”; and (3) she asserts that the district court erred in dismissing her
Eighth Amendment claim, which is based on the United States Supreme Court’s
opinion in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings
(Docket Nos. 32210 and 33312)1
The state charged Johnson with, and a jury convicted her of, the firstdegree murders of her parents, Alan and Diane Johnson. State v. Johnson, 145
Idaho 970, 972, 188 P.3d 912, 914 (2008).

“The district court sentenced

Johnson to concurrent life sentences, plus fifteen years under I.C. § 19-2520 for
a firearm enhancement.” Id.
Johnson raised three issues on direct appeal: (1) whether the district
court erred in giving an aiding and abetting instruction to the jury; (2) whether she

1

Both Johnson and the state filed motions for judicial notice, asking the district
court to take judicial notice of several items related to Johnson’s underlying
criminal case (Docket No. 33312), and her initial post-conviction case (Docket
No. 38769). (R., pp.167-168, 276-313.) The district court granted the parties’
request for judicial notice. (3/2/2015 Tr., p.4, L.4 – p.5, L.25.)
1

was deprived of her right to a unanimous jury verdict because the district court
did not require the jury to agree on whether she actually killed her parents or
whether she aided and abetted their murders; and (3) whether her “constitutional
rights were violated when the district court failed to remove a certain juror from
the jury pool or obtain an unequivocal commitment that the juror would follow all
of the court’s instructions.” Johnson, 145 Idaho at 972, 188 P.3d at 914. The
Idaho Supreme Court denied relief on all of Johnson’s claims and affirmed her
convictions. See generally Johnson, supra.
Course Of Initial Post-Conviction Proceedings (Docket No. 38769)
Johnson filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was
initially granted, in part, in relation to Johnson’s claim that counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a timely notice of appeal from her judgment of conviction.
Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 10, 319 P.3d 491, 494 (2014) (“Johnson II”). As a
result, the district court re-entered the judgment of conviction, and “Johnson
immediately filed a timely notice of appeal.” Id. The post-conviction proceedings
were then stayed pending resolution of Johnson’s direct appeal. Id.
Following her direct appeal, Johnson filed a Second Amended Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief, raising numerous claims. Johnson II, 156 Idaho at 10,
319 P.3d at 494. The allegations in Johnson’s second amended petition included
that:
(1) Her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit testimony
from Robert Kerchusky, the defense’s fingerprint expert; (2) the
unidentified prints on the murder weapon, its scope, and an insert
from the box of ammunition were fresh; and (3) newly discovered
evidence warranted a new trial. The newly discovered evidence
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claim was based on the discovery that Christopher Hill’s fingerprints
matched the previously unidentified prints on the murder weapon,
its scope, and the ammunition.
Johnson II, 156 Idaho at 10, 319 P.3d at 494.
The district court summarily dismissed some of Johnson’s claims, but
“held an evidentiary hearing on six claims including Johnson’s claims regarding
counsel’s alleged failure to inquire about the age or ‘freshness’ of the unidentified
prints and the newly discovered evidence claim.” Johnson II, 156 Idaho at 10,
319 P.3d at 494. Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed
Johnson’s remaining claims. Id.
On appeal from the denial of relief on her initial post-conviction claims, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that (1) Johnson received effective assistance of
counsel; and (2) the identification of Hill’s fingerprints did not entitle Johnson to a
new trial. Johnson II, 156 Idaho at 10-13, 319 P.3d at 494-497. The Remittitur
issued on March 12, 2014.
Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings (Docket No. 42857)
On April 9, 2012, while her post-conviction appeal was pending, Johnson,
with the assistance of pro bono counsel, filed the following documents in the
original post-conviction case:

(1) a DNA and Successive Petition for Post-

Conviction Relief (“Successive Petition”); (2) Motion for Appointment of Counsel;
(3) Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b); and (4) the
Affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian in Support of DNA and Successive Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.4-98.) On January 22, 2014, Johnson filed an
Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“Amended

3

Successive Petition”).2 (R., pp.99-158.) Johnson subsequently withdrew her
Motion for Relief from Judgment, and the district court ordered Johnson’s
Successive Petition, Amended Successive Petition, and Dr. Hampikian’s affidavit
to be filed “in a separate case and assigned a separate case number.” (R.,
p.160.)
In her Amended Successive Petition, Johnson sought additional DNA
testing pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902(b). (R., pp.104-111.) Johnson also raised
several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (R., pp.111-134.) Specifically,
Johnson alleged: (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to file a motion to
dismiss based on the state “discarding the comforter” that was on Alan’s and
Diane’s bed at the time Johnson murdered them (R., pp.111-114); (2) trial
counsel were ineffective for failing to present evidence of a witness’s “parole
status” (R., pp.115-118); (3) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to
prosecutorial misconduct “throughout the trial” (R., pp.118-120); (4) trial counsel
were ineffective for failing to object to allowing the jury to view the location of the
murders (R., pp.120-122); (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on an
alleged conflict of interest (R., pp.123-128); (6) ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel for failing to challenge the district court’s denial of Johnson’s motion to
suppress (R., pp.129-132); and (7) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for
failing to “argue that the fixed life sentences were both excessive and
unconstitutional” (R., pp.132-135). Finally, Johnson alleged a violation of Brady

2

The amended petition was also filed in Johnson’s original post-conviction case.
(See R., p.99.)
4

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (R., pp.135-138), and an Eighth Amendment
violation based on Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (R., pp.138-153).
Anticipating challenges to her Amended Successive Petition on the
grounds that it was untimely and an improper successive petition, Johnson
alleged that she was entitled to pursue a successive petition because, she
claimed, her original post-conviction attorney was ineffective, and she alleged the
successive petition was timely because she filed it while her initial post-conviction
appeal was “still pending.” (R., pp.156-157.)
The state filed a motion for summary dismissal of Johnson’s Amended
Successive Petition, along with a supporting brief. (R., pp.170-190.) The state
requested dismissal of Johnson’s DNA claim because Johnson failed to establish
she was entitled to additional DNA testing under the requirements set forth in I.C.
§ 19-4902(b). (R., pp.178-184.) The state requested dismissal of Johnson’s
remaining claims on two bases.

First, the state asserted that Johnson’s

Amended Successive Petition should be dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908,
which precludes successive petitions absent a sufficient reason and, under the
Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 389
(2014), the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not
constitute a sufficient reason. (R., pp.184-185.) Second, the state requested
dismissal of Johnson’s Amended Successive Petition on the basis that it is
untimely. (R., pp.16-18.)
Johnson filed an “objection” to the state’s motion for summary dismissal,
arguing that she was entitled to additional DNA testing (R., pp.194-208), and that

5

there was “sufficient reason” to raise her Eighth Amendment claim, and the claim
was timely, because the Supreme Court opinion on which it was based “was not
decided until June 25, 2012, six years after [she] filed her original petition for
post-conviction relief” and “two months before” she filed her successive petition
(R., p.210), and because she included the claim in her Amended Successive
Petition while her initial post-conviction appeal was still pending (R., p.211). With
respect to her ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Johnson conceded the
claims were foreclosed by Murphy, and asserted she could raise the claims
“directly in federal court and bypass the state courts entirely.” (R., p.209.)
The state filed a reply addressing Johnson’s “objections” to its request for
summary dismissal (R., pp.227-233), after which the district court held a hearing
on the state’s motion (see generally Tr.).

Following the hearing, the court

entered a written decision granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal and
a Judgment dismissing Johnson’s Amended Successive Petition. (R., pp.236254.) Johnson filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (R., pp.273-274),
which the district court denied (R., pp.339-343).
Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.314-317, 345-349.)

6

ISSUES
Johnson states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the District Court err in failing to permit DNA testing?
Specifically, did the Court err in concluding that comparison of
previously obtained but unidentified DNA against Christopher Hill’s
DNA and the expanded government databases was not a new
technology not available at the time of trial? Further, did the Court
err in its analysis of whether the result of the requested DNA testing
has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence
that would show that it is more probable than not that Sarah is
innocent? And did the Court err in concluding that based on the
trial evidence Sarah cannot ever show that she should be allowed
DNA testing?
2.
Should this Court overrule Murphy, supra, as it is both
manifestly wrong and an unwise relinquishment of state
sovereignty? If so, should Claims 2-5, which were dismissed
pursuant to Murphy, be remanded to the District Court to determine
whether sufficient cause exists to allow the claims to be raised in a
second petition?
3.
Did the District Court err in dismissing the Miller claim as it
was not waived, Miller applies retroactively to Idaho, and Sarah’s
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Miller?
(Opening Brief of Appellant (“Appellant’s Brief”), pp.12-13.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Johnson failed to show the district court erred in concluding she failed
to meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case for additional DNA testing
under I.C. § 19-4902?
2.
Should this Court decline to consider Johnson’s request to overrule
Murphy, supra, in light of Johnson’s agreement to dismiss the claims barred by
Murphy and her stated intent to “bypass the state courts entirely” and pursue
those claims in federal habeas? Even if Johnson did not waive her challenge to
Murphy, should this Court decline to address it because the Court can affirm the
dismissal of Johnson’s Claims Two through Five because the claims were not
timely filed? Alternatively, has Johnson failed to show any basis for overruling
Murphy?

7

3.
Has Johnson failed to show error in the district court’s summary dismissal
of her Eighth Amendment claim because the claim is barred by I.C. § 19-4901
and I.C. § 19-4908, is untimely, and otherwise fails to allege a genuine issue of
material fact entitling Johnson to relief?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Determining She
Failed To Meet Her Burden Of Establishing A Prima Facie Case For Additional
DNA Testing Under I.C. § 19-4902
A.

Introduction
Johnson contends the district court erred in denying her request for

additional DNA testing pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902. Application of the statutory
requirements for DNA testing support the district court’s conclusion that Johnson
failed to present a prima facie case that she is entitled to additional DNA testing
under I.C. § 19-4902.
B.

Standard Of Review
“An interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court

exercises free review.” State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 286 P.3d 537, 539
(2012) (brackets, quotations, and citation omitted).
C.

Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Determining
She Failed To Meet Her Burden Of Establishing A Prima Facie Case For
Additional DNA Testing Under I.C. § 19-4902
In Claim One of her Amended Successive Petition, Johnson sought relief

pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902(b).

(R., pp.104-111.)

The district court properly

dismissed this claim.
Idaho Code § 19-4902(b) provides, in relevant part:
A petitioner may, at any time, file a petition before the trial
court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for
the performance of fingerprint or forensic deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial
which resulted in his or her conviction but which was not subject to

9

the testing that is now requested because the technology for the
testing was not available at the time of trial.
Subsection (c) of I.C. § 19-4902 requires the petitioner to present a prima
facie case that “(1) Identity was an issue in the trial which resulted in his or her
conviction; and (2) The evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of
custody sufficient to establish that such evidence has not been substituted,
tampered with, replaced or altered in any material aspect.” The court must allow
the testing only if it determines that:

“(1) The result of the testing has the

scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that
it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent; and (2) The testing
method requested would likely produce admissible results under the Idaho rules
of evidence.” I.C. § 19-4902(e).
In support of Claim One, Johnson submitted two affidavits from Dr. Greg
Hampikian. (R., pp.84-91, 217-220.) Dr. Hampikian averred that new “advanced
DNA amplification and purification techniques” are now available, and were not
available at the time of trial, and such techniques may be used to test various
evidentiary items that were admitted at trial. (See generally R., pp.84-90.) Dr.
Hampikian identified the new “techniques” as including “post amplification
cleanup with Montage columns, and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis.”
(R., p.86.)

In his second affidavit, Dr. Hampikian further explained the new

technology, which he alleged was not available until after Johnson’s trial, and
explained which items could be tested pursuant to this new technology. (R.,
pp.218-220.)

Specifically, Dr. Hampikian averred:

(1) “Post amplification

cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy (LCN) DNA analysis are new

10

technology which allows DNA testing on much smaller samples than was
available at the time of Sarah Johnson’s trial in 2005”; (2) a “new more sensitive
Globalfiler DNA amplification kit,” made available in 2012, “amplifies 24 regions
of DNA yielding up to 48 alleles, rather than the 16 DNA regions (up to 32 alleles)
available in the older Identifier DNA amplification kit”; (3) the new “techniques
represent new DNA technology that has produced results from samples that had
been declared ‘untestable’ due to low amounts of DNA, or that produced
‘inconclusive’ results”; (4) “computational tools called intelligent systems” are now
available “that can deal with low level DNA results, and produce meaningful
results that human analysts overlook”; (5) the “new technology will permit DNA
testing to be done on samples that could not have been tested at the time of the
trial”. (R., pp.218-219.) As for the items to be tested, Dr. Hampikian averred:
11.
In particular, no conclusions could be reached due to
insufficient amounts of DNA concerning the bloodstain 24 from the
robe, the tissue from the lower left side of the robe, the tissue from
the inside lower back of the robe, the tissue from the inside left
sleeve of the robe, the stain from Bruno Santos’ pants, the fibers
imbedded in unknown material, bloodstain B from the rifle, and
bloodstain G from the rifle. This evidence may now be tested using
advanced DNA amplification, purification, and analysis techniques.
12.
Robe samples #24-30 were never analyzed and may
now be tested using advanced DNA amplification, purification, and
analysis techniques.
13.
DNA from the unidentified fingerprint on the .264
round (Item # 14) could not have been tested at the time of trial, but
may now be tested using advanced DNA amplification, purification,
and analysis techniques.
14.
DNA from the unidentified fingerprints on the
doorknob set on Diane and Alan Johnson’s bedroom door (Items #
15-16) could not have been tested at the time of trial, but now may
be tested using advanced techniques not available at the time of

11

trial and compared to reference samples from the time of trial and
after and submitted to a CODIS databank.
15.
DNA from the palm prints (Items 20-2 and 20-3) could
not have been tested at the time of trial, but may now be tested
using advanced DNA amplification, purification, and analysis
techniques.
16.
DNA from the print on the empty shell casing (Item
12-1) could not have been tested at the time of trial, but now may
be tested using advanced DNA amplification, purification, and
analysis techniques.
17.
One of the hairs removed from Bruno Santo’s [sic]
sweater has a small root and could now be analyzed using
advanced DNA amplification, purification, and analysis techniques.
18.
Low levels of DNA from an unidentified source were
found on the leather glove from the garbage can. That DNA can
now be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification, purification
and analysis techniques.
(R., pp.219-220.)
Regarding the statutory requirement that the tests Johnson seeks to have
performed are based on “technology” that was not available at the time of trial,
the statute does not define what that means.

DNA testing was obviously

available at the time of trial and a significant amount of DNA testing was done in
Johnson’s case and the results of those tests were introduced at trial. (See
#32210 Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3088-3209 (DNA testimony by forensic scientist
Cindy Hall).) That new “techniques” for DNA testing may be available does not
mean the technology for DNA testing was unavailable at the time of trial; clearly it
was. As recently noted by the Court of Appeals: “Technology is not unavailable
at trial merely because technology is now ‘dramatically better.’” McGiboney v.
State, ___ Idaho ___, 370 P.3d 747, 751 (Ct. App. 2016).

12

On appeal, Johnson focuses on whether the availability of Christopher
Hill’s DNA, and other DNA samples in the state database that did not exist at the
time of her trial, for comparison purposes is new technology under I.C. § 194902(b).

(Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)

According to Johnson “DNA profiles now

available on CODIS and the DNA profile of Christopher Hill, are new
technologies.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.) This argument is contrary to the plain
language of the statute and defies common sense.
Idaho Code § 19-4902(b) provides for DNA “testing,” not DNA
comparisons to the state database.

Moreover, the ability to compare DNA

samples existed at Johnson’s trial, and was in fact done in relation to the DNA
evidence collected in her case. Thus, the ability to compare samples is not a
new technology. The fact that the database may now have more samples to
compare does not mean the database is a new technology. Johnson’s argument
to the contrary is without merit.
The next statutory requirement Johnson must satisfy is a prima facie case
that identity was an issue at trial. I.C. § 19-4902(c)(1). The statute provides no
guidance on what this requirement means and the state is unaware of any
existing authority interpreting this language. If identity is an issue whenever a
defendant denies guilt,3 then identity was at issue in Johnson’s case. If identity is
not an issue when there is undisputed evidence that the defendant was present
at the scene of the crime and there is evidence, including DNA evidence, that the

This is presumably not the standard since the statute allows even those who
plead guilty to seek relief. I.C. § 19-4902(d) (“A petitioner who pleaded guilty in
the underlying case may file a petition under subsection (b) of this section.”).
3
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defendant committed the crime, then identity was not an issue in Johnson’s case
and she is foreclosed from obtaining any relief under I.C. § 19-4902(b). Also
relevant to the question of whether identity was an issue at trial is the fact that
the jury was fully aware that, in addition to Johnson’s DNA, there was DNA at the
crime scene that was unidentified,4 just as it was aware that there were
fingerprints on the murder weapon that did not belong to Johnson. Nevertheless,
the jury convicted Johnson based on the evidence linking her to the murders.
The identity of the person who contributed the samples that were unidentified at
trial does not mean that identity was an issue as to Johnson because she was
clearly identified as an individual whose DNA was found on several incriminating
pieces of evidence, in addition to all of the other evidence of Johnson’s guilt.
Even if Johnson has established the predicate technology requirement of
subsection (b) and has alleged a prima facie case that identity was an issue at
trial as required by subsection (c)(1), the district court properly denied Johnson’s
request for additional testing under subsection (e)(1) because the result of any
testing does not have the “scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative
evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that [Johnson] is
innocent.” The district court detailed the overwhelming evidence of Johnson’s
guilt in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Johnson’s first postconviction case:
For example, the “majority” of the DNA found on the latex glove matched
Johnson’s, but there was, as Dr. Hampikian notes, “another DNA source in a
lower concentration present;” however, “it was not a complete profile.” (#32210
Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3110, Ls.17-20, p.3112, Ls.5-9; Hampikian Aff, p.7.)
Johnson’s request to pursue further testing of an item such as this supports the
conclusion that Claim One should be denied.
4
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The court also does not find it surprising that Johnson’s
fingerprints were not on the weapon, the scope, or any of the
ammunition or packaging, given that a leather glove was found in
her room in the trash can, and the matching glove was wrapped in
Johnson’s robe ready for trash pickup, along with a latex glove
containing Johnson’s DNA.
...
Nothing presented to this court during the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing establishes that Johnson, even if she were not
the actual shooter, was not complicit as an aider and abettor.
It is undisputed that Johnson was home at the time of the
murders. There was no forced entry in this case, either to the
Johnson home or the guesthouse; Johnson’s bedroom contained
.264 caliber cartridges, a 9mm magazine and a right-handed
leather glove matching the left one wrapped in Johnson’s robe in
the garage; both gloves belonged to Diane and were kept in the
family vehicle; the knives found in the guest bedroom and at the
foot of the Johnsons’ bed were located where an intruder or
stranger would have difficulty finding them; Johnson had a key to
the guesthouse; Johnson was angry with her parents because they
disapproved of her relationship with Santos; and Johnson gave
numerous conflicting stories about what she allegedly was doing
when her parents were shot.
...
This court’s reference to the aiding and abetting theory is not
to say that this court is unconvinced of Johnson’s direct culpability
for the murder of her parents, as argued by the state at trial. Add to
the above-noted circumstances the DNA evidence, Johnson’s
motive for the crimes, her access and her opportunity . . ..
...
. . . The evidence against Ms. Johnson which exists in this
record is, indeed, “overwhelming.”
(#38769 R., vol. 7, pp.1923-1926 (numbering of paragraphs omitted).)
The district court also noted the trial judge’s apt assessment of the
evidence against Johnson:

15

[T]o suggest to a reasonable jury such things that somebody
off of the street could come and find that gun in the guest house,
find those bullets in the guest house, know when the parents were
going to be there; find the knives in the kitchen that are hidden, the
one knife that’s hidden behind the microwave or bread box,
whatever it was, in the dark, no less; go out past the family dog that
the evidence was would bark, and the dog didn’t bark. Take the
same route that Sarah Johnson told the police she took out of the
house, past the trash can where the robe is found. Get her
bathrobe out of the bathroom next to her room, and not awaken or
bother her.
Both doors being open, according to her experts, the
parents’ bedroom door and her bedroom door. Do all of this in the
dark and not disturb the parents just defies common sense.
(#37869 R., vol. 7, p.1924 (quoting #33312 Supp. Appeal Transcript, pp.449450).)
Again quoting the trial judge:
The jury heard all of the evidence about the robe. The jury
doesn’t have to believe that the crime occurred exactly the way the
defense theory is that it occurred. The argument of no blood, no
guilt; well, the converse of that is if there’s blood, there is guilt. And
there’s blood. There’s blood all over the robe, blood on the socks.
. . . There’s not one piece of evidence that excludes the
defendant from the commission of this crime that I heard. She’s
right there. And her defense – I mean her defense people, Howard
and Mink, testify – and Iman, I believe, all three – at least two of
them testified that the doors were open. The door to the parents’
bedroom, which is propped open by the pillows, and the door to
Sarah Johnson’s room is open.
The match to the leather glove, one leather glove that was taken
out of the Suburban, that’s something else that this unnamed killer
would have had to have known, is where the gloves were located,
the mother’s gloves in the Suburban. Located those in the dark, as
well, and brought them into the house to help commit this crime.
And leave one in Sarah Johnson’s room with two cartridges for the
.264; unspent, unfired cartridges in Sarah Johnson’s room that part
of her mother’s body parts were found on; and leave those in Sarah
Johnson’s room, all while not disturbing Sarah Johnson, it just
doesn’t make sense to me.
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And I don’t think it would make sense to the jury. One of the
leather gloves found in her room, the other one found out –
wrapped up in the trash can inside the pink robe. That’s what I
mean by the circumstantial evidence here, and she admits being
there.
The evidence is overwhelming.
(#38769 R., pp.1925-1926 (quoting #33312 Supp. Appeal Transcript, pp.450451).)
With respect to whether the additional DNA testing requested by Johnson
did not have “the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that
would show that it is more probable than not that [Johnson] is innocent,” I.C. §
19-4902(e)(1), consistent with its prior findings and the observations of the trial
court, the district court explained:
At trial, a considerable amount of evidence was presented
that placed Johnson at the scene and that linked her to the
murders. Her stories were inconsistent and conflicted with the
evidence. Her DNA was found in a latex glove, found wrapped in
her blood splattered robe, and discarded in a trash can on the
property. She knew where the murder weapon was kept (in the
guest house safe) and had requested the key a few days earlier.
See also this court’s opinion in Johnson v. State, CV-2006-0324,
pp.89-92 (Outlining the “mountain of evidence” against Johnson
and quoting Judge Wood as stating at trial that the amount of
evidence against Johnson was “overwhelming.”)
Evidence was also presented that suggested the possible
involvement of another party, in the form of unidentified fingerprints
and unidentified DNA. The defense argued Johnson’s innocence
under the theory that a stranger entered the house and murdered
Johnson’s parents. The jury considered this evidence and heard
these arguments and still convicted Johnson of first degree murder.
Therefore, the possibility of identifying a third party DNA
source from previously untestable samples will not make it more
probable than not that Johnson is innocent, just as the post-trial
discovery that the fingerprints on the murder weapon belonged to
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Christopher Hill did not entitle Johnson to a new trial. The jury was
aware that DNA that did not belong to Johnson was present at the
scene of the murders, just as they were aware that the fingerprints
on the rifle were not hers. Even with that knowledge, the jury
convicted Johnson, deciding that Johnson either (1) fired the
murder weapon herself while wearing gloves or (2) aided and
abetted the actual shooter. Either theory was sufficient for a
conviction. Given the fact that the possibility of a third party
shooter, as evidenced by the presence of unidentified fingerprints
and DNA, failed to convince the jury that Johnson was innocent of
murdering her parents, the slim possibility that a name or face
might now be given to that shooter adds little to the mix.
(R., pp.245-246.)
On appeal, Johnson complains that the district court’s analysis required
her to “prove in advance of the testing what the results will be” and argues that
“weighing the evidence is not appropriate at this juncture.” (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.18-19.) Johnson made this same argument in her Motion to Alter or Amend,
and the district court correctly rejected it. (R., pp.256-277, 339-342.) The plain
language of I.C. § 19-4902(e) clearly predicates the entitlement to testing, in part,
“upon a determination that” “[t]he result of the testing has the scientific potential
to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more
probable than not that the petitioner is innocent.” Johnson’s claim that a court
must ignore the evidence in making this determination is contrary to law.
Johnson also contends, that even if weighing the evidence is proper, the
“State’s theory of the case was far-fetched” and any weighing is in her favor.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.19.) This argument is contrary to the record and the many
prior determinations regarding the quality and quantity of evidence supporting
Johnson’s murder convictions. Certainly 12 jurors did not find the state’s theory
far-fetched, nor was the trial court’s conclusion, or the post-conviction court’s
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conclusion both now and in Johnson’s prior post-conviction case, which the
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, that there was substantial evidence of Johnson’s
guilt erroneous.
Johnson also continues to disregard what the bulk of the DNA evidence
showed. First, most of the 30 stain samples taken from the robe matched Diane
and others were consistent with Johnson’s profile and Diane and Alan could not
be excluded as contributors. (#32210 Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3115-3117, 34393455.) The fact that there were a few “unknown” stains out of the 30 stains
tested from the robe pales in comparison to the volume of positively identified
DNA. (#32210 Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3446, 3454-3455.) Also notable is that the
unknown DNA from the top of the gun barrel did not match the unknown DNA
from the robe, and the stains on the gun barrel that were positively identified
matched Alan’s DNA. (#32210 Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3461-3465.) This is notable
for at least two reasons.

First, Johnson’s continued attempt to impugn

Christopher Hill (or anyone else) seems to rely, in part, on the DNA from the gun
matching the DNA on the robe, but we already know the samples do not match.
Second, Johnson’s implication that the murderer deposited blood on the gun
barrel is entirely speculative.
The district court correctly concluded Johnson failed to meet her burden of
showing she is entitled to additional DNA testing under I.C. § 19-4902. Johnson
has failed to show otherwise.

19

II.
Because Johnson Agreed To The Dismissal Of Her Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel And Brady Claims, This Court Should Decline To Consider Her Request
To Overrule Murphy And Remand Those Claims For Further Consideration;
Alternatively, The Court Need Not Reconsider Murphy Because Johnson’s
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel And Brady Claims Were Not Timely Filed;
Even If The Court Addresses Johnson’s Request To Reconsider Murphy,
Johnson Has Failed To Articulate Any Valid Basis For Overruling It
A.

Introduction
In her Amended Successive Petition, Johnson raised several ineffective

assistance of counsel claims and a substantive Brady claim (R., pp.111-138),
and asserted the claims were timely and could be raised in a successive petition
due to the alleged ineffective assistance of initial post-conviction counsel (R.,
pp.154-157).

Approximately one month after Johnson filed her Amended

Successive Petition, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Murphy v.
State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), in which it held that ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel does not constitute a sufficient reason for
filing a successive petition. The state, therefore, sought dismissal of Johnson’s
ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims based on Murphy, and based
on timeliness. (R., pp.184-187.) Johnson thereafter conceded her ineffective
assistance of counsel and Brady claims were barred by Murphy, and advised that
she would “bypass the state courts entirely” and “file a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus raising the ineffective assistance of counsel claims” under Martinez v.
Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013). (R.,
p.209.) The district court, therefore, dismissed the claims based on Johnson’s
concession that “Idaho case-law precludes her from proceeding” on these claims.
(R., p.240.)
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On appeal, Johnson asks this Court to overrule Murphy and remand her
ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims to the district court to
“determine whether sufficient reasons exists [sic] to raise them in [a] successive
petition.”

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.33, 41.)

This Court should reject Johnson’s

request for three reasons: (1) the dismissal of Johnson’s ineffective assistance
of counsel and Brady claims was invited; (2) regardless of Murphy, Johnson’s
ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims are untimely; and (3) Johnson
has failed to establish any basis for overruling Murphy.
B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from the summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court “will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on
the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and
will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).
The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony are
matters within the discretion of the trial court. Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700,
702, 274 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted).
C.

Because Johnson Invited Dismissal Of Her Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel And Brady Claims, This Court Should Decline To Consider
Johnson’s Request To Overrule Murphy And Have Those Dismissed
Claims Remanded For Further Proceedings
After the state requested summary dismissal of Johnson’s ineffective

assistance of counsel and Brady claims based, in part, on the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Murphy, supra, Johnson conceded that Murphy “appears to present a
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bar to their presentation” and stated she would “file a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus raising the ineffective assistance of counsel claims” “directly in federal
court and bypass the state courts entirely.” (R., p.209 (emphasis added).) At
the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Johnson reiterated this
concession and her intention to proceed to federal court, stating: “[W]e concede
that, following the Murphy decision of our Supreme Court, there are certain
claims that have been obviated. As Mr. Benjamin has pointed out, that matter
can be taken up in federal habeas proceedings.” (10/20/2014 Tr., p.20, Ls.1216.)
As a result of Johnson’s concession, the district court dismissed
Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims (Claims Two
through Five), stating:
Johnson conceded in her Objection to Respondent’s Motion
for Summary Dismissal that Idaho case-law precludes her from
proceeding on four of the six claims included in her Successive
Petition. At the hearing held on 10/20/14, both parties[5] stipulated
to the dismissal of these claims. Therefore, claims two through five
of Johnson’s Successive Petition are summarily dismissed.
(R., p.5 (footnote citation to Murphy omitted).)
Despite her concession and her representation in district court that she
intended to “bypass the state courts entirely” with respect to her ineffective
assistance of counsel and Brady claims, Johnson asks this Court to overrule
Murphy and remand those claims to the district court for further proceedings.

5

At the summary dismissal hearing, counsel for the state noted that Johnson
indicated in her objection to the state’s motion that, in light of Murphy, she would
pursue her ineffective assistance of counsel claims in federal habeas.
(10/20/2014 Tr., p.6, Ls.14-22.)
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(Appellant’s Brief, pp.33-41.) This Court should decline to consider Johnson’s
argument because she invited the dismissal of those claims.

See State v.

Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 420, 348 P.3d 1, 35 (2015) (“The invited error doctrine
precludes a criminal defendant from ‘consciously’ inviting district court action and
then successfully claiming those actions are erroneous on appeal.”); Row v.
State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001) (citation omitted) (“The
longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised
for the first time on appeal.”).
Although the state acknowledges that the district court was bound to
follow this Court’s decision in Murphy, and had no authority to overrule it, if
Johnson wished to ask this Court to overrule that decision on appeal from the
denial of her Amended Successive Petition, she was required to preserve the
issue by asserting her intention to do so – she did not. In fact, Johnson did the
opposite by telling the district court that she intended to “bypass the state courts
entirely” with respect to her ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims,
and pursue those claims in federal habeas. (R., p.209.)
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Because Johnson agreed6 to the dismissal of her ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, this Court should decline her request to reconsider Murphy so
that those claims can be remanded for further proceedings.
D.

This Court Need Not Consider Whether To Reconsider Murphy In Order
To Affirm The Dismissal Of Johnson’s Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
And Brady Claims Because It Can Affirm On The Alternative Basis That
The Claims Are Untimely
Even if this Court concludes that Johnson did not waive her challenge to

Murphy, this Court need not address her request to overrule it because the state
requested dismissal of Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the
alternative basis that the claims are untimely. (R., pp.16-18.) Because Johnson
agreed that her claims should be dismissed based on Murphy, the district court
was not required to address the state’s timeliness argument. (See R., p.240.)
However, because Johnson had notice of this ground for dismissal as a result of
the state’s motion (R., pp.185-187), and she presented an argument in her
Second Amended Petition as to why she believed the claims were timely filed
(R., p.157), this Court may affirm the dismissal of Johnson’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on the basis that the claims were not timely filed.
6

Johnson takes issue with the district court’s characterization that she stipulated
to the dismissal of her ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5 n.3 (“Contrary to the District Court’s understanding,
[Johnson] never stipulated to the dismissal of any of her claims.”).) Although
there was no formal stipulation entered with respect to the dismissal of Johnson’s
ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims, a stipulation is nothing more
than an agreement. See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stipulation.
Because the record supports the conclusion that Johnson agreed her ineffective
assistance of counsel and Brady claims were barred by Murphy and should be
dismissed, her complaint about the district court’s use of the word “stipulated” is
purely semantical.
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See Caldwell v. State, 159 Idaho 233, 358 P.3d 794 (Ct. App. 2015) (“Absent . . .
notice, we may not affirm on a theory other than that upon which the district court
based the summary dismissal.”).
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be
commenced by filing a petition “any time within one (1) year from the expiration
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later.” In the
case of successive petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has “recognized that rigid
application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering ‘claims
which simply are not known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise
important due process issues.’” Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d
1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d
870, 874 (2007)). However, absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitation
period should be tolled, the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief
is a basis for dismissal of the petition. Rhoades, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066;
Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Kriebel v. State, 148
Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009).
The relevant inquiry in deciding if Johnson’s successive petition was
timely filed requires consideration of whether Johnson filed her successive
petition within a reasonable time of when the claims raised in the petition were
known or reasonably could have been known. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904,
174 P.3d at 874.

Claims Two, Three, and Four in Johnson’s Amended

Successive Petition allege trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for various
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reasons. (R., pp.111-135.) These claims were known, or reasonably could have
been known, when Johnson filed her original petition or even when she filed the
second amended petition in her initial post-conviction case. Rhoades, supra.
The same is true for Johnson’s fifth claim – that the state allegedly withheld
exculpatory evidence regarding the identity of Christopher Hill’s fingerprints –
since this claim was not only known when Johnson filed the second amended
petition in her initial post-conviction action, those fingerprints were the subject of
the evidentiary hearing in that case with respect to Johnson’s assertion that she
was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. That Johnson
reframed the claim as a Brady violation in her Amended Successive Petition
does not make the claim timely.
Contrary to Johnson’s assertion in her Amended Successive Petition,
Claims Two through Five are not timely just because she thinks it is “not
unreasonable in terms of timeliness to file a successive petition even before
litigation has concluded on the original petition.”

(R., p.59.)

Indeed, this

argument ignores the applicable standard for assessing timeliness as it says
nothing about when the claims were known, or reasonably could have been
known.
Because Claims Two through Five in Johnson’s Amended Successive
Petition were not timely filed, this Court should affirm the dismissal of these
claims based on timeliness without addressing Johnson’s request to overrule
Murphy.
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E.

To The Extent This Court Considers Johnson’s Request To Overrule
Murphy, It Should Decline Johnson’s Invitation To Do So Because She
Has Failed To Show Murphy Was Wrongly Decided
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act specifically provides that “[a]ll

grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his
original, supplemental or amended application.” I.C. § 19-4908. “Any ground
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any
other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for
a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted
which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the
original, supplemental, or amended application.” Id.
In Murphy, the Court held that “because [there is] no statutory or
constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, [a postconviction petitioner] cannot demonstrate ‘sufficient reason’ for filing a
successive petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel.” 156
Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371. Thus, after Murphy, an allegation that postconviction counsel was ineffective no longer constitutes a sufficient reason for
pursuing a successive post-conviction petition.
Johnson asks this Court to overrule Murphy, arguing Murphy “is manifestly
wrong,” “illogical,” and “unwise.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.33-41.) Although Johnson
has recited the correct standards for overruling precedent, she has failed to show
those standards are satisfied in relation to her request to overrule Murphy.
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The Court “will ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions unless it is
shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven over
time to be unwise or unjust.” State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483,
490 (2012) (citations omitted). Johnson contends Murphy is “manifestly wrong
because it interprets the statutory phrase ‘sufficient reason’ to require a showing
of a constitutional violation.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.34.) This argument reflects a
misunderstanding of the Court’s holding in Murphy.
The Court in Murphy was not purporting to interpret the meaning of the
words “sufficient reason,” the Court was considering whether an allegation of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel constitutes a sufficient reason
for purpose of filing a successive petition under I.C. § 19-4908. That inquiry
required the Court to analyze whether there is such a thing as “ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel” because something that does not exist
cannot constitute any reason, much less a sufficient one. In addressing this
question, the Court correctly concluded that because there is no constitutional or
statutory right to post-conviction counsel, a claim that post-conviction counsel
was ineffective necessarily fails because such a claim is predicated on the
existence of a right in the first instance. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394-395, 327 P.3d
at 370-371. Johnson’s focus on whether the legislature “intended the phrase
‘sufficient reason’ to require the deprivation of a constitutional right” misses the
point. (Appellant’s Brief, p.34.) The Court in Murphy did not need to ascertain
the legislature’s intent in order to determine that a non-existent reason could not
be a sufficient reason.
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Johnson also argues that Murphy should be overruled because it “is
unwise because it shifts the duty of adjudicating state cases to the federal court.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.38.) Johnson elaborates on this argument as follows:
The unintended consequence of Murphy is that it has given
the federal courts the opportunity to decide state ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims as an original
matter, when under Palmer [v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d
955 (1981),7] the claims would have had to be raised in a
successive petition and ruled upon by the state courts before they
could be raised in federal court. As a matter of state judicial policy,
state trial courts should be resolving allegations that state trials
were not fair. State appellate courts should review those rulings.
And, the federal courts should only overturn those decision when
petitioners can overcome the highly deferential standard of federal
court review applied to exhausted claims. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).
However under Murphy, ineffective assistance claims, which would
have previously been decided in state court, are now being raised
in federal court under Martinez. And, the federal court may review
these claims de novo because there are no state court findings of
facts [sic] or conclusions of law for the federal court to defer to.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.39-40 (footnote omitted).) Johnson’s reasons for claiming
that Murphy was unwise, while perhaps superficially appealing, do not withstand
scrutiny.
The first premise of Johnson’s “Murphy is unwise” argument is that the
Court in deciding Murphy was ignorant of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Martinez and, therefore, did not contemplate the “consequences” of its decision.
There is no basis for this assertion. The Supreme Court issued Martinez on
7

In Palmer, the Court held that “allegations of ineffective assistance of prior
postconviction counsel, if true,” would satisfy the “sufficient reason” requirement
for filing a successive post-conviction petition. 102 Idaho at 596, 635 P.2d at
960. Murphy overruled this holding. 156 Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371 (“[W]e
overrule Palmer and hold that because Murphy has no statutory or constitutional
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, she cannot demonstrate
‘sufficient reason’ for filing a successive petition based on ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel.”).
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March 20, 2012. 132 S.Ct. 1309. Murphy was decided nearly two years later, on
February 25, 2014. 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365. Surely the Idaho Supreme
Court managed to become aware of Martinez at some point during that two-year
period before issuing Murphy. Even if it had not, the Court has had several
opportunities since Murphy to reconsider its decision in light of Martinez and
remedy whatever consequences it did not intend, if any. See, e.g., Grant v.
State, 156 Idaho 598, 329 P.3d 380 (Ct. App. 2014), review denied July 31,
2014; Gerdon v. State, Docket Nos. 40454/40455, 2014 WL 1572544 (Idaho
App. April 21, 2014), reviewed denied June 20, 2014; Atwell v. State, Docket No.
39996, 2013 WL 5984363 (Idaho App. May 3, 2013), review denied June 12,
2013. That said, whatever consequences flow from Murphy in light of Martinez
are not necessarily subject to any remedy because to overrule Murphy for that
reason would require the Idaho Supreme Court to endorse the fiction of an
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claim, which would be contrary
to Supreme Court precedent, just to avoid the “consequences” of other Supreme
Court authority, i.e., Martinez. As the Court has noted in the context of statutory
interpretation, the Court’s duty is to “follow[ ] the law as written,” it is not to ignore
the law in favor of other objectives. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011).
The second, but related, premise of Johnson’s “Murphy is unwise”
argument is that Murphy has resulted in a “relinquish[ment] [of] state sovereignty
by letting the federal courts do the work the state courts have traditionally done
and allowing the federal courts to hear evidence never presented to the state
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court and using that evidence to rule on claims never presented to the state
courts.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.41.)

Aside from her concerns about state

sovereignty and the ability of Idaho courts to adjudicate ineffective assistance of
trial and appellate counsel claims before the federal court does, Johnson “has
not pointed to anything in the record showing that during the last [two] years
[Murphy] has proved to be [an] unwise” relinquishment of state sovereignty.
Koivu, 152 Idaho at 519, 272 P.3d at 491. That a federal court may, pursuant to
Martinez, decide a procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of trial or
appellate counsel claim without input from the state court does not demonstrate
that Murphy was “unwise” because Johnson has cited no evidence that the
federal court has been unable to decide such claims correctly. In other words,
Johnson has cited no federal case that has, as a result of Murphy and Martinez,
resulted in a federal court vacating the conviction of an Idaho defendant based
on a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, Johnson’s argument boils
down to an assertion that Idaho state courts, including this Court, should do more
work just in case there is a point in the future where the deference afforded state
court judgments on federal habeas review might make a difference. This “do
more work for sovereignty” argument falls far short of demonstrating the Court in
Murphy was unwise for allowing it to happen; indeed, some might argue Murphy
was wise because it relieved the state courts of the burden of entertaining
multiple successive petitions based on allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394, 327 P.3d at 370 (quotations and citation
omitted) (noting the “logic behind” a rule preventing ineffective assistance of
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counsel claims from being raised in successive post-conviction petitions is “that if
counsel for post-conviction proceedings, as well as trial and direct appeal, must
meet the same standards, then claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
immediate prior proceeding may be raised ad infinitum”).
That the United States Supreme Court has seen fit for “equitable” reasons
to burden the federal courts with considering ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claims and procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims does not mean the Idaho Supreme Court was unwise for
relieving the state courts of the same burden. This is especially true considering
the reality that federal courts have long been able to interfere with a state court’s
resolution of a claim even before Martinez if the federal court determined that the
state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of,” Supreme Court precedent, or was “based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). While state sovereignty is important, and deference to
state court factual findings and decision-making is nice, Johnson has failed to
show those principles support a determination that it was unwise for the Idaho
Supreme Court in Murphy to reach the legally correct conclusion that because
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a cognizable claim, it
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cannot be a sufficient reason for filing a successive post-conviction petition.8
Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing this Court should
overrule Murphy.
III.
Johnson Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Dismissal Of Her Eighth
Amendment Claim
A.

Introduction
Claim Six in Johnson’s Amended Successive Petition alleges an Eighth

Amendment violation based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama,
132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).

(R., pp.138-153.)

The state moved for summary

dismissal of this claim pursuant to the successive petition bar, I.C. § 19-4908,
and because the claim was not timely filed. (R., pp.184-187.) The district court
dismissed Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b) and
I.C. § 19-4908, and the district court found that Miller does not apply to Idaho’s
non-mandatory sentencing scheme for first-degree murder. (R., pp.248-252.)
On appeal, Johnson contends:

(1) she “did not waive her Eighth

Amendment claim by not raising it in her direct appeal or first post-conviction
petition” because Miller had not been issued so she “[c]learly” could not raise it in
either of those proceedings (Appellant’s Brief, pp.41-42); (2) she timely alleged

8

The state notes that Johnson’s argument also fails to account for the fact that
federal courts can, pursuant to Martinez, review procedurally defaulted ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims if the post-conviction petitioner was
unrepresented in her initial post-conviction proceeding – a common occurrence
given that a trial court is not required to appoint post-conviction counsel in Idaho.
I.C. § 19-4904. Thus, the sacrifice of sovereignty upon which Johnson relies is
even more limited than her argument suggests.
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the Eighth Amendment claim because “the appeal in her first post-conviction
case was still pending” when she alleged the claim in her Amended Successive
Petition (Appellant’s Brief, p.42); and (3) “the fact that Miller was not decided until
after both her original and successive petition had been filed is ‘sufficient reason’
to permit her to raise the claim” in a successive petition “under I.C. § 19-4908”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.43).9 Johnson also argues that the district court erred in
concluding Miller does not apply to her case. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.44-52.)
All of Johnson’s arguments fail. The district court correctly dismissed this
claim because, notwithstanding Johnson’s assertions to the contrary, she could
have raised her Eighth Amendment claim on direct appeal, the claim was
untimely, there was no sufficient reason to assert the claim in a successive
petition, and Miller does not apply in Idaho.
B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court “will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on
the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and
will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Kelly, 149 Idaho at 521, 236 P.3d at 1281.
9

In her initial brief, Johnson also argues Miller is retroactive. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.52-66.) That argument was made prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), in which the Court expressly
decided that Miller is retroactive. Consequently, Johnson filed a supplemental
brief arguing that Montgomery “conclusively proves” the district court erred in
dismissing her Eighth Amendment claim. (See generally Supplemental Brief of
Appellant (“Supplemental Brief”).) In light of Montgomery, the state will not
address Johnson’s argument that Montgomery is retroactive, but will address her
claim that Montgomery “proves” the district court erred.
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The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).
“The burden of demonstrating that a sentence is cruel and unusual is on the
person asserting the constitutional violation.” State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682,
686, 991 P.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted).
C.

Johnson Has Failed To Demonstrate Any Error In The District Court’s
Dismissal Of Her Eighth Amendment Claim
After the jury found Johnson guilty of two counts of first-degree murder,

and the weapon enhancement, the trial court imposed “concurrent life sentences,
plus fifteen years under I.C. § 19-2520 for a firearm enhancement.” Johnson,
145 Idaho at 972, 188 P.3d at 914. In Idaho, the penalty for first-degree murder
in a non-capital case is “a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of
not less than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the offender shall
not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good
conduct, except for meritorious service.” I.C. § 18-4004.
Johnson did not raise an Eighth Amendment claim, or any other challenge
to her sentence, on direct appeal. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 972, 188 P.3d at 914
(identifying issues). Nor did Johnson raise an Eighth Amendment sentencing
claim in her initial post-conviction case (#38769 R., Vol. 3, pp.801-825), or in her
initial successive post-conviction petition (R., pp.4-46.) The first time Johnson

35

raised an Eighth Amendment claim was in her Successive Amended Petition,
filed January 22, 2014.

(R., pp.99, 137-153.)

With respect to that claim,

Johnson alleged: “In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller
that statutory schemes mandating life imprisonment without parole for those
under age 18 at the time of the offense violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.” (R., p.142.) The district court correctly
dismissed this claim pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b) and I.C. § 19-4908, and
because Miller does not apply since Idaho does not have a “mandatory fixed life
sentencing scheme.” (R., pp.250-252.) Johnson’s challenges to each of these
grounds for dismissal fail.
1.

Johnson’s Eighth Amendment Claim Is Barred By I.C. § 19-4901(b)
Because Johnson Could Have Raised The Claim On Direct Appeal

The remedy available under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
“is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings
in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction.” I.C. § 194901(b); accord Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348, 353 (1997)
(“An application for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal.”).
Thus, any “issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is
forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings” except upon
a “substantial factual showing” by admissible evidence “that the asserted basis
for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and
could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.” I.C. §
19-4901(b) (emphasis added). A challenge to a defendant’s sentence, whether
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based on state law sentencing objectives or the Eighth Amendment, is a claim
that Johnson could have raised on direct appeal.10 See, e.g., State v. Adamcik,
152 Idaho 445, 485, 272 P.3d 417, 457 (2012) (raising cruel and unusual
punishment claim under the Idaho Constitution)11; State v. Draper, 151 Idaho
576, 597-598, 261 P.3d 853, 874-875 (2011); State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385,
392-394, 825 P.2d 482, 489-491 (1992); State v. Shanahan, 133 Idaho 896, 899900, 994 P.2d 1059, 1062-1063 (Ct. App. 2000); Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 991
P.2d 870. The district court correctly concluded as much. (R., pp.248-249.)
Johnson contends the district court erred in its determination that she
could have raised her Eighth Amendment claim on direct appeal because, she
argues, the “claim is based upon the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller[, supra],
which was not decided until June 25, 2012,” which was “four years after the
opinion in her direct appeal was issued.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.41-42.) However,
the date the Supreme Court issued Miller is irrelevant not only because Miller
does not apply in Idaho for reasons explained infra, but also because Johnson
did not need existing authority from the United States Supreme Court in order to
advance an Eighth Amendment argument. Compare Draper, 151 Idaho at 597598, 261 P.3d at 874-875 (asserting Eighth Amendment claim based on juvenile
status prior to Miller). If that were a requirement, Miller could never have brought
10

The exception in I.C. § 19-4901(b) does not apply because Johnson’s Eighth
Amendment claim does not “raise[ ] a substantial doubt about the reliability of the
finding of guilt.”

11

Appellate counsel in Adamcik is the same attorney who represented Johnson
in her successive post-conviction proceedings and who is representing Johnson
on appeal. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 452, 272 P.3d at 425.
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a successful claim. Johnson’s argument that she could not have presented her
Eighth Amendment claim before Miller is without merit. See United States v.
Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2004) (counsel’s failure to anticipate
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002), was not ineffective); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir.
2002) (quoting United States v. Gonzales-Lerma, 71 F.3d 1537, 1542 (9th Cir.
1995) (“we have rejected ineffective assistance claims where a defendant faults
his former counsel not for failing to find existing law, but for failing to predict
future law and have warned ‘that clairvoyance is not a required attribute of
effective representation’”). The fact that one of the claims in Johnson’s original
successive petition, which was filed prior to Miller, is that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise an Eighth Amendment claim is consistent with this
position. (R., pp.37-39.)
Johnson has failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion that her
Eighth Amendment claim was subject to dismissal under I.C. § 19-4901(b).
2.

Johnson’s Eighth Amendment Claim Is Barred By I.C. § 19-4908
Because She Did Not Provide A Sufficient Reason To Overcome
The Successive Petition Bar And The Claim Was Not Timely Filed

As noted, a post-conviction “petitioner must generally raise all claims for
post conviction-relief in his original petition” unless “there is ‘sufficient reason’
that the claim ‘was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original
[petition].’” Johnson v. State, 158 Idaho 852, 854, 353 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Ct. App.
2015) (quoting I.C. § 19-4908, brackets original).

The point of the sufficient

reason “exemption is designed to permit petitioners to surpass the statutory
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limitation of one petition for post-conviction relief to assert a claim that could not
have been made in the original petition.” Johnson, 158 Idaho at 857, 353 P.3d at
1091 (citations omitted). For the reasons already stated in subsection III.C.1,
supra, Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim is one that could have been raised in
her original petition. Johnson argues otherwise, asserting, inter alia, that Miller
was a necessary prerequisite to her Eighth Amendment claim because, she
contends, “Miller created a substantive change in Eighth Amendment law,
especially as the cruel and unusual punishment clause has been interpreted in
Idaho.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.43.) Johnson cites State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,
253 P.3d 310 (2011), as an “example” of this supposed change to Idaho’s
interpretation of the “cruel and unusual punishment clause.” (Appellant’s Brief,
p.43.) This argument is without merit.
The Court in Windom did not, as Johnson claims, interpret the “cruel and
unusual punishment clause.”
Amendment claim.

In fact, Windom did not raise an Eighth

Windom instead claimed his sentence was an abuse of

discretion and an “improper judicial hedge against uncertainty.”12 150 Idaho 873,
876, 253 P.3d 310, 313. In affirming Windom’s fixed life sentence, the Idaho
Supreme Court adhered to its prior state law requirement that a fixed life

12

Although the dissent in Windom discussed Eighth Amendment principles,
Windom’s claim was not premised on the Eighth Amendment, nor did the
majority evaluate any unraised Eighth Amendment claim. 150 Idaho at 880 n.2,
253 P.3d at 317 n.2 (noting dissent’s reliance on Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct.
2011 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), “in support of the
conclusion that the district court abused its discretion,” but declining to “confuse
[its] well-established standard of review of a trial court’s sentencing decision by
selective application of statements found in decisions defining the scope of
Eighth Amendment protections”).
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sentence “requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator cold never be
safely released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that
the individual spend the rest of his life behind bars.” Windom, 150 Idaho at 876,
253 P.3d at 313.

That the Idaho Supreme Court has its own standards for

imposing a fixed life sentence in addition to the standards under the Eighth
Amendment, or the Idaho Constitution, does not mean that the Court has
authorized the ability to impose fixed life without consideration of a defendant’s
age. To the contrary, consistent with the rationale of Miller, Idaho’s appellate
courts have repeatedly recognized that age is a mitigating factor that should be
considered by a sentencing court. See, e.g., State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 620,
710 P.2d 526, 530 (1985) (“The age of a defendant is likewise a legitimate
consideration in the evaluative process as a mitigating factor.”); State v.
Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 388, 716 P.2d 1152, 1160 (1985) (discussing
defendant’s young age as an important factor in sentencing); State v. Moore, 127
Idaho 780, 785, 906 P.2d 150, 155 (Ct. App. 1995) (“when a juvenile is
sentenced as an adult, a juvenile defendant’s age is one of the many
circumstances that a sentencing court may and should consider in fashioning an
appropriate sentence”). Johnson’s claim that “Windom was overruled in part by
Miller” is without merit.13 (Appellant’s Brief, p.43.)

13

Johnson repeats this argument in her Supplemental Brief, but further contends
that Miller also overruled Adamcik, supra, and Draper, supra, in which the Court
relied on language from Windom. (Supplemental Brief, p.4.) The argument fails
in relation to Adamcik and Draper for the same reason it fails in relation to
Windom. To the extent Johnson believes the argument was reinforced as a
result of Montgomery, for the reasons set forth, infra, Montgomery does not
change the inapplicability of Miller in Idaho.
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In addition, Johnson did not allege a sufficient reason for not raising her
Eighth Amendment claim until she filed her Amended Successive Petition on
January 22, 2014 (as opposed to presenting the claim in her initial postconviction case or even in her initial successive petition), which was 18 months
after Miller was decided on June 25, 2012. “A court considering whether there is
sufficient reason for filing the claim in a successive petition must consider
whether the claim was asserted within a reasonable time.” Johnson, 158 Idaho
at 854, 353 P.3d at 1088 (citing Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875).
Johnson argues her Eighth Amendment claim is timely because she filed her
Amended Successive Petition “while the appeal in her first post-conviction case
was still pending.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.42.) Johnson relies on Hernandez v.
State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999), for the proposition that a
successive petition is timely as long as it is “filed one year after the decision on
the appeal from the original petition.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.42-43.) Johnson’s
reliance on Hernandez is misplaced.
In Hernandez, the court reiterated the rule that the provision in I.C. § 194902(a) that allows for the filing of a post-conviction petition “within one (1) year
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal
or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal” “does not
encompass a separately filed proceeding under the UPCPA.” 133 Idaho at 797,
992 P.2d at 792 (citing Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 836 P.2d 1088 (Ct.
App. 1992)). While the court found Hernandez’s successive petition timely even
though it was filed more than one year after the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
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the dismissal of Hernandez’ original petition, the court did so on the theory that it
“relate[d] back to the date of filing of the first application.” Hernandez, 133 Idaho
at 798, 992 P.2d at 793. Johnson fails to acknowledge the basis for the court’s
decision much less explain why her successive petition should be timely based
on a relation back theory. Nor could Johnson make such a showing given that
the relation back principle applied in Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 798, 992 P.2d at
793, was based on Palmer, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 995, which was overruled
by Murphy, supra.

Indeed, any attempt by Johnson to relate her Eighth

Amendment claim back to the filing of her original petition would be contrary to
her contention that it is the proper subject of a successive petition because the
case upon which she relies did not exist when she filed her first petition.
The proper analysis for deciding whether Johnson’s Eighth Amendment
Claim is timely requires a showing, by Johnson, that the general one-year
limitation period for post-conviction petitions should be tolled. Rhoades v. State,
148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009). Johnson has not and cannot
satisfy that standard because the ability to bypass the limitation period is
premised on a recognition that ”rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude
courts from considering ‘claims which simply are not known to the defendant
within the time limit, yet raise important due process issues.’” Rhoades, 148
Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069 (quoting Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174
P.3d at 874). As noted, Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim is one that could
have been raised in her original petition even without the benefit of Miller. Also,
just as Johnson asserted in her initial successive petition that her appellate
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counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an Eighth Amendment claim on direct
appeal and, in doing so, noted that Miller was pending before the United States
Supreme Court (R., p.39), she could have also raised a substantive Eighth
Amendment claim at that time, but did not do so. Instead, Johnson waited 18
months after Miller was decided to raise a substantive Eighth Amendment claim.
This was not reasonable.
To endorse the standard advocated by Johnson – that a successive
petition is timely if it is filed within one year of the appellate court’s decision on
the initial petition - would allow petitioners the ability, in some instances, to wait
years before asserting their claims regardless of whether they have knowledge of
them just because they have another action pending.

Not even capital

defendants have that luxury and the state fails to see any reason why Johnson
should. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008) (“[W]e
hold that a reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction
relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known
of the claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were extraordinary
circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that time
period. In that event, it still must be filed within a reasonable time after the claim
was known or knowable.”).
Johnson filed her Amended Successive Petition on January 22, 2014; the
purpose of the amendment was to include a substantive Eighth Amendment
claim.

The Supreme Court decided Miller, on which Johnson’s Eighth

Amendment claim is based, on June 25, 2012.
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Eighteen months is not a

reasonable time by any standard, including the one-year limitation period set
forth in I.C. § 19-4902(a), nor did the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller constitute
a sufficient reason for pursuing a successive post-conviction petition. Johnson’s
claims to the contrary fail, and Johnson has failed to show error in the district
court’s summary conclusion that Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim was subject
to dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908.
3.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That, Regardless Of The
Procedural Bars To Johnson’s Eighth Amendment Claim, Because
Miller Does Not Apply In Idaho, Johnson Is Not Entitled to Relief On
Her Eighth Amendment Claim

In Claim Six of her Amended Successive Petition, Johnson alleged her
fixed life sentences violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. (R., p.138.) Johnson’s claim was based on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Miller, in which the Supreme Court held that a statutory
scheme that requires imposition of a mandatory fixed life sentence for juvenile
murderers, without the possibility of parole, violates the Eighth Amendment
because it “runs afoul” of the Court’s cases that require “individualized
sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties.” 132 S.Ct. at 2460.
The district court sentenced Johnson to two fixed life terms for first-degree
murder as authorized by I.C. § 18-4004. Idaho Code § 18-4004 requires a “life
sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years”;
it does not require a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole.
Thus, the statute under which the court sentenced Johnson does not “run[ ]

44

afoul” of the Eighth Amendment. The district court was correct in reaching this
conclusion. (R., p.251.14)
In her Supplemental Brief, Johnson argues that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Montgomery “conclusively proves the District Court was wrong” in
dismissing her Eighth Amendment claim. (Supplemental Brief, p.1.) Johnson is
incorrect.
The holding of Miller is “that mandatory life without parole for those under
the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (emphasis
added).

That statutory schemes that required mandatory life sentences for

juvenile offenders was what “runs afoul” of the Eighth Amendment was the
Court’s concern in Miller is readily apparent not only from the facts of Miller, but
from the Court’s repeated reference to the mandatory sentencing scheme at
issue. The opinion began with the Court noting:
The two 14-year-old offenders in these cases were convicted
of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. In neither case did the sentencing authority have any
discretion to impose a different punishment. State law mandated
that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would have
thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics, along with
the nature of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life
with the possibility of parole), more appropriate. Such a scheme
prevents those meting out punishment from considering a juvenile’s
lessened culpability and greater capacity for change, and runs afoul
of our cases’ requirement of individualized sentencing for
defendants facing the most serious penalties. We therefore hold
that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at

14

The district court also noted that “Miller ha[d] not been found to be retroactive”
(R., p.251); the Supreme Court has since held that it is. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct.
718 (2016).
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the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishments.
Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (bold added, italics original; quotations and citations
omitted).

In discussing the rationale for its holding, the Court referenced its

concern with “mandatory” sentences no less than five times. 132 S.Ct. at 2466
(“But the mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentencer from
taking account of these central considerations.”); 132 S.Ct. at 2468 (“To recap:
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his
chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”); id. (“And finally,
this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when
the circumstances most suggest it.”); 132 S.Ct. at 2469 (“We therefore hold that
the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison
without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”); 132 S.Ct. at 2471 (“Our
decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of
crime . . .. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—
considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a
particular penalty.”). And, importantly, the Court emphasized that its decision did
not “categorically bar” a fixed life sentence for a juvenile; it only mandates that a
sentencing body have the opportunity to consider the “offender’s youth and
attendant characteristics.” 132 S.Ct. at 2471. This point was reiterated in the
Court’s concluding paragraph:
. . . [O]ur individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a
judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for
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juveniles. By requiring that all children convicted of homicide
receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole,
regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the
nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before
us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2475.
Johnson cannot escape the conclusion that Miller’s ban on statutorily
mandated fixed life sentences does not apply in her case. Montgomery does not
change this fact.
The issue in Montgomery was whether the holding of Miller “is retroactive
to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller
was decided.” 136 S.Ct. at 725. The Court held that it is. Id. at 732-736. While
the Supreme Court could, and did, make the holding in Miller in retroactive, it did
not, and could not, retroactively change the holding of Miller. Johnson argues
otherwise, citing the Court’s reasoning for finding the rule in Miller was
substantive as evidence that Miller holds more than what it said. Specifically,
Johnson notes the language in Montgomery where the Court stated, in relevant
part: “Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is
excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption, it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for a class of
defendants because of their status – that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes
reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.5 (quoting

Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 734).) Johnson extrapolates from this that, regardless
of whether the juvenile offender received a statutorily mandated fixed life
sentence, a fixed life sentence is unconstitutional if the defendant’s crime
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“reflect[ed] the transient immaturity of youth.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-6.) This is
incorrect. When read in context, the quoted language from Montgomery, made
in the context of deciding Miller created a substantive rule, did not expand the
holding of Miller, it merely articulated the rationale of Miller. Indeed, the very
page the Court in Montgomery cited from Miller, also includes the following: “By
making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that
harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment. Because that holding is sufficient to decide these
cases, we do not consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles,
or at least for those 14 and younger.” 132 S.Ct. at 2469. It cannot rationally be
argued that the Court’s retroactivity discussion in Montgomery expanded the rule
in Miller to include something the Court in Miller expressly did not consider.15
Johnson’s claim to the contrary fails.
In the event this Court concludes that Miller applies to Johnson’s nonmandatory fixed life sentence, the requirements of Miller were satisfied because
the trial court could, and did, consider Johnson’s age in imposing sentence and
had discretion to impose less than a fixed life sentence. Indeed, if that were not
true, there would have been no need for the lengthy sentencing hearing, with
expert testimony, which, as the district court noted, focused on Johnson’s

15

The state also notes that Montgomery, like the defendants in Miller, was
sentenced to fixed life because the “sentence was automatic upon the jury’s
verdict, so Montgomery had no opportunity to present mitigation evidence to
justify a less severe sentence.” Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 726. Thus, not even
the facts of Montgomery support a claim that Miller held more than it did.
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adolescence. (R., pp.251-252.)

Nor would the court need to have bothered

spending 44 pages of transcript explaining the reasons for its sentence, including
its consideration of Johnson’s age and her capacity for change. (#32210 Tr., Vol.
IX, pp.6457-6501.) While the district court did not make an express finding that
Johnson’s crimes were not merely the product of “the transient immaturity of
youth,” that finding is implicit in the comments it did make. (Id.) Johnson’s
claims to the contrary are without merit. (Supplemental Brief, pp.10-12.)
Johnson has failed to show any error in the district court’s determination
that Miller does not apply to Idaho’s non-mandatory sentencing scheme. Even if
Miller does apply, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing her fixed life
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the Judgment dismissing
Johnson’s Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
DATED this 17th day of June 2016.

__/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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